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June 9, 2003Key Issues
• Canada and Mexico Joined the NAFTA to 
Obtain Preferred (tariff free) and More Secure 
Access to the United States Market
– How Can This Access be Maintained – While Meeting 
Legitimate Security Concerns? 
– How Real is the Bioterrorism Threat?
– What Would be the Economic Effects of a 

































































Can+MexCanada’s Agri-Food Exports: Total, US, 




















US+MexFraction of Canada’s Agri-Food Exports to 























US+MexFrom Where Would an Attack 
Originate?
• United States
• NAFTA Partner Country
• Other CountryTerrorism Targets
• Humans





• About 40% of Canada’s Shipments to the 
US Move Via Rail
– 60% of total at 4 border crossings
• Most of the Rest Via Truck
– 60% of total at 4 border crossings – 55 % 
from 3 border crossings in Ontario aloneProduct Flows
A Border Slow Down Changes
“Just in Time Delivery”
to
“Give Me Time Delivery”How Real is a Biosecurity Threat?
• “The US livestock industry…is extremely 
vulnerable to a host of highly infectious 
and often contagious biological 
agents…APHIS…would probably be 
unable to help eradicate intentional 
introduction, especially if this were done at 
multiple sites.”
National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer. 2002Terrorism Targets
• The Major Economic Impacts Would 
Come From Terrorist Attacks on Livestock 
and Crops
• In Taiwan a Naturally Occurring FMD 
Outbreak in Swine Only
– 1/3 of herd destroyed
– exports to zero
– price declined 44%
– revenue declined 64%Foot and Mouth Disease
• “How To” List on APHIS Web Site
• Easy to Transport
• Highly Infectious
• Major Cost to Eradicate
• No Risk to Human HealthFMD Control Measures
• Protect Disease Free Zones Through Animal 
Movement Control
• Slaughter Infected, Recovered and Susceptible 
Animals
• Disinfect: Premises, Implements, Trucks, Cars, 
Clothes
• Destruction of Cadavers, Litter, and Animal 
Products in Infected Area
• QuarantineGTAP
• Computable General Equilibrium Model
• Captures Economy Wide Effects
– Perfect competition
– Constant returns to scale, CES technology
– Domestic and imported products are treated as 
differentiated goods via the Armington assumption
– Welfare changes measured using equivalent variation
– 11 Agricultural sectors
– 9 Countries/regionsFoot and Mouth Disease
• Modeled Via Negative Productivity Shocks 





• Intermediate Inputs (feed) ReleasedScenarios – FMD in US Only
• Scenario 1A
– 5 % reduction in Output of Cattle, Milk and Swine
• Scenario 1B
– 10 % reduction in Output of Cattle, Milk and Swine
• Scenario 1C
– 20 % reduction in Output of Cattle, Milk and Swine
• Borders Remain Open!!!!Scenarios – FMD in US Only
• Scenario 2
– 10 % reduction in Output of Cattle, Milk and 
Swine
– A ban on US Exports of Livestock, Swine, 
Meat and Dairy Products to FMD-Free 
CountriesScenarios – FMD in US Only
• Scenario 3
– 10 % reduction in Output of Cattle, Milk and 
Swine
– A Ban on US Exports of Livestock, Swine, 
Meat and Dairy Products to FMD-Free 
Countries
– Shift in US Domestic Demand Away from 
Domestic Products and Towards Foreign 








































ExportsEffect of Adding a Ban on US 
















banEffect of Adding a Ban and a Demand Shift 



































DairyEffect of a Ban and a Demand Shift on 











































• Cost of Control, Compensation and 
Eradication Neglected
• Short-Run Effects
• Small Price Increase for SwineThanks And Let’s Hope There Is 
Never an Attack!!!